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TS 000233

Subject:

Evaluation of the Next Actions by the USER

in Bespect to the Cuban Situation

TO:

Director, Fishs and Policy The Joint Staff

- Reference J-5 M 806-62.
- 2. In keeping with the explanatory remorks by General Turnage regarding the referenced request, the attached analysis, "Soviet Actions Stamming from the Present Cuban Situation," has been prepared.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1 Itch HIA Analysis Cuben Situation (75)
(Cys. 1, 2, 3 & 4) (4, 49 only)

Copy to: De. MOVNTAIN Col Desire, ISA 3 E263 Col Yeager, ISA 3 D274

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SOUTH AND ON ATTENDED FAIR THE PROPERT CHAIR STREETS

The present Outen situation" is hore taken to means no further build-up of offensive missiles or siroroft; an impending discontinuent of such mineries already in Oute; no further stops toward boutilities.

Fundamentally, Soviet actions, particularly military estima, in the enquing scaths will be guided by cold, uncontinual consideration of the factors establishing the overall belance of forces in the world.

Foremost in this process will be the florist sessented of UE willingness to content, by any amous necessary, a Soviet military move against any area to which the UE has consisted itself.

Also importantly influencing Soviet decisions will be their appearant of the high state of vigor and solicarity in the Sestern alliance systems.

The UESE will also be conscious of the charged stillades of the lasding "mentral" mation, India, and the effect of the investor by Gains on the Communist appropriate as well as on the rest of the mentrals and the world at large.

A final factor influencing Seviet behavior in the most six contas or so will be the descent of challenging the US twice and again allowing the US to have the indicatifuling the US to have the indicatiful of time of

resolute predisposition. Again, was retains to Soviet pretime and sizes sould result either in drestin loss of Boviet prestige and influence or, and periods also, the need to revitalize the Soviet image by measures beyond that level where the US response might be controlled or influenced.

Thus, while Soviet military capabilities remain imprecaive, it expense that now, more than ever in the recent past, if the USSE is to challenge the US it will more likely challenge us in a military wanter on only these issues which the Sovietc believe the US is willing to lose. Given this point of departure, leaves which the USSE might expisit as an extensible response to the Cohen affair do not suggest themelyee.

On the whole, Section in lane likely to be echiected to Section williarly presented than if Cohe had not happened. It seems willhaly that the Seviets feet any real need simply to test US resolve or imbentions there. An outright military conflict probably appears ill-advised — because of the risk of general war and because the local action could be frustrated with attendant further descape to the Seviet image. Produce and Communist dichetes against "reckless adverturies" will probably cause action against Berlin to be delayed until, at a minimum, it can be suspletely disassociated from Cohe.

Military action in Asia some quite possible in view of Sine-Soviet expebilities. Such action would, however, be hard to relate to Cube. The one area that suggests itself as a "response" to Oubs is the Taiwan Straits area. Here amain, there is no need to test UB resolve and even greater danger of local military defiat. Other areas are not so francist with danger, but other considerations operate to make the likelihood of action more dependent on local issues rather than on Othe. Foremost smoog these restraining considerations are the Sino-Soviet disgute and Soviet concern lest China also fail or become this to involve the Wilk beyond its own desires. The Indian border investon has had and will have far-reaching implications for Asian and Morad attitudes toward China and toward Commentsm. It could prove to be enduringly emberressing, if, as seems likely. Indian remistance is sufficient to the task. It is also possit . that a new, Western-oriented defence alignment will energy across South Asia, particularly on the sub-continent.

These, military actions which were, or could be construed to be, related to Cube are probably viewed by the Soviets as too dangerous. Military actions which were not related to Cube, or which could not be so construed, will depend on local issues 400, in the main, are not indicated.

Hilitary actions which might be undertaken without undue risks and which might contribute, or be made to contribute, to

the refurnishing of the Soviet image, would be demonstrative acts in the fields of weepons and delivery systems development. Suchear testing seems, in view of the recent past, to be less promising them developments in the general field of missiles, space vehicles and missile defence. Dynamic demonstrations could prove valuable — probably more so if accompanied by anderste statements of Soviet power and "forebearance under provocation."

On the whole, however, the most likely Soviet reaction to the Cuban affeir is a call for renewed (and possibly truly meaningful) discussions to reduce tensions and the espaintles of the major powers to bring about general war. This seems to be the best way now open to impair the vigor of the Mestern alliance; to underscore the rew fast of bi-polarity of power which Cuba demonstrated, thus, parkage, to play upon and exploit national sensitivities of our Allies. At a minimum, this would result in some diminution of US effectiveness; at a maximum, it could induce the West to rewert to a condition where its energies could be dissipated on a number of comparatively minor issues.

Nome of the foregoing is intended to convey the impression that the Communists will coase to be Communists — bent on world demination. Eather, it seems to convey the view that the Soviet lesderable is unlikely to probe or confront the Mest militarily in the next six months.

Ochs, however, constitutes quite a problem in itself beyond this time period. The US Herel base at Commission will probably continue under heavy pressure, in a diplometic sense, once the current origin has absted. In this case, however, the USER is more likely to play a secondary — though critical role. Cute, itself, with or without Castro, will be portrayed as the sole instinctor, with the USER supporting its claim to "noveweignty" and the right to expel foreign military presses. In this connection, the success of the US in removing the offensive mission would be cited as partial "justification" for Subs's thesis.

Horeover, it is quite possible that, again after "risis abatement, the USER would continue, if not expend, its development of defensive military strength in Cubs. This could be done either so a static pressure behind moves toward detente and selected awars of arms central, or as a simple device to frustrate US objectives for Latin America.



TS 000233

Evaluation of the Next Actions by the USSR in Respect to the Cuban Situation SUBJECT:

Director, Plans and Policy TO:

The Joint Staff

1. Reference: J-5 M806-62

2. In keeping with the explanatory remarks by General Turnage regarding the referenced request, the attached analysis, "Soviet Actions Stemming from the Present Cuban Situation," has been prepared.

SOVIET ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE PRESENT CUBAN SITUATION

The "present Cuban situation" is here taken to mean: no further buildup of offensive missiles or aircraft; an impending dismantlement of such missiles already in Cuba; no further steps toward hostilities.

Fundamentally, Soviet actions, particularly military actions in the ensuing months will be guided by cold, unemotional consideration of the factors establishing the overall balance of forces in the world.

Foremost in this process will be the Soviet assessment of US willingness to contest, by any means necessary, a Soviet military move against any area to which the US has committed itself.

Also importantly influencing Soviet decisions will be their assessment of the high state of vigor and solidarity in the Western alliance systems.

The USSR will also be conscious of the changed attitudes of the leading "neutral" nation, India, and the effect of its invasion by China on the Communist movement as well as on the rest of the neutrals and the world at large.

A final factor influencing Soviet behavior in the next six months or so will be the danger of challenging the US twice and again allowing the US to have the initiative in a time of

resolute predisposition. Again, two rebuffs to Soviet pretensions could result either in drastic loss of Soviet prestige and influence or, and perhaps also, the need to revitalize the Soviet image by measures beyond that level where the US response might be controlled or influenced.

Thus, while Soviet military capabilities remain impressive, it appears that now, more than ever in the recent past, if the USSR is to challenge the US it will more likely challenge us in a military manner on only those issues which the Soviets believe the US is willing to lose. Given this point of departure, issues which the USSR might exploit as an ostensible response to the Cuban affair do not suggest themselves.

On the whole, Berlin is less likely to be subjected to Soviet military pressures than if Cuba had not happened. It seems unlikely that the Soviets feel any real need simply to test US resolve or intentions there. An outright military conflict probably appears ill-advised -- because of the risk of general war and because the local action could be frustrated with attendant further damage to the Soviet image. Prudence and Communist dictates against "reckless adventurism" will probably cause action against Berlin to be delayed until, at a minimum, it can be completely disassociated from Cuba.

Military action in Asia seems quite possible in view of Sino-Soviet capabilities. Such action would, however, be hard to relate to Cuba. The one area that suggests itself as a "response" to Cuba is the Taiwan Straits area. Here again, there is no need to test US resolve and even greater danger of local military defeat. Other areas are not so fraught with danger, but other considerations operate to make the likelihood of action more development on local issues rather than on Cuba. Foremost among these restraining considerations are the Sino-Soviet dispute and Soviet concern lest China also fail or become able to involve the USSR beyond its own desires. The Indian border invasion has had and will have far-reaching implications for Asian and World attitudes toward China and toward Communism. It could prove to be enduringly embarrassing, if, as seems likely, Indian resistance is sufficient to the task. It is also possible that a new, Western-oriented defense alignment will emerge South Asia, particularly on the sub-continent.

Thus, military actions which were, or could be construed to be, related to Cuba are probably viewed by the Soviets as too dangerous. Military actions which were not related to Cuba, or which could not be so construed, will depend on local issues and, in the main, are not indicated.

Military actions which might be undertaken without due risks and which might contribute, or be made to contribute, to

the refurbishing of the Soviet image, would be demonstrative acts in the fields of weapons and delivery systems development. Nuclear testing seems, in view of the recent past, to be less promising than developments in the general field of missiles, space vehicles and missile defence. Dramatic demonstrations could prove valuable -- probably more so if accompanied by moderate statements of Soviet power and "forbearance under provocation."

On the whole, however, the most likely Soviet reaction to the Cuban affair is a call for renewed (and possibly truly meaningful) discussions to reduce tensions and the capacities of the major powers to bring about general war. This seems to be the best way now open to impair the vigor of the Western alliances; to underscore the raw fact of bi-polarity of power which Cuba demonstrated, thus, perhaps, to play upon and exploit national sensitivities of our Allies. At a minimum, this would result in some diminution of US effectiveness; at a maximum, it could induce the West to revert to a condition where its energies could be dissipated on a number of comparatively minor issues.

None of the foregoing is intended to convey the impression that the Communists will cease to be Communists -- 'ent on world domination. Rather, it seeks to convey the view that the Soviet leadership is unlikely to probe or confront the West militarily in the next six months.

Cuba, however, constitutes quite a problem in itself beyond this time period. The US Naval base at Guantanamo will probably continue under heavy pressure, in a diplomatic sense, once the current crisis has abated. In this case, however, the USSR is more likely to play a secondary -- though critical role. Cuba, itself, with or without Castro, will be portrayed as the sole instigator, with the USSR supporting its claims to "sovereignty" and the right to expel foreign military powers. In this connection, the success of the US in removing the offensive missiles would be cited as partial "justification" for Cuba's thesis.

Moreover, it is quite possible that, again after crisis abatement, the USSR would continue, if not expand, its development of defensive military strength in Cuba. This could be done either as a static pressure behind moves toward detente and selected areas of arms control, or as a simple device to frustrate US objectives for Latin America.